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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates how capital market participants such as investors and financial analysts perceive corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) as improving earnings quality. Managers use CSR as a signal of future financial 
improvement, which causes companies to invest in CSR in the current period. An expectation of future financial 
improvement leads to increase in the quality of earnings because it curtails the incentive to engage in earnings 
management. In addition, CSR is a signal to increase the reputation of the  firm. If a firm values its reputation, managers 
of a CSR firm would refrain from earnings management to avoid damage to its reputation. We use a sample of Korean 
listed companies for the period 2002–2011 and a proxy for CSR involvement based on the Korea Economic Justice 
Institute index. When we use earnings response coefficients (ERCs) to measure investors’ perceptions of earnings 
quality, we find that ERCs are higher for firms with engagement in CSR activity. Further, when we use the predictive 
ability of past earnings in forecasting future earnings to measure analysts’ perceptions of earnings quality, we find 
that the predictive ability of past earnings is higher when firms engage in CSR. Our results provide evidence that 
capital market participants perceive CSR as a signal of improved earnings quality. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); Perception of Earnings Quality; Earnings Response Coefficient  
(ERC); Earnings Forecasts  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
orporate social responsibility (CSR) has been conceptualized in a number of studies. At the initial stage, CSR 
is defined as a social contribution (Levitt 1958) or is evaluated in terms of ethical performance (Friedman 
1970). Recent studies treat the concept as an interaction between business and society (Porter and Kramer 
2006; Bessen et al. 2005). For example, the Enron Corporation, which was associated with a large-scale accounting 
scandal, was thought to have faithfully fulfilled its social responsibility because of its contribution to many different 
social causes – until its accounting fraud was detected. After the Enron accounting scandal, the concept of CSR began to 
change. Not only a corporation’s social contribution, but also its corporate sustainab ility, management practices, and 
governance came to be considered as part of CSR (Kim et al. 2012; Burkett et al. 2006; Linthicum et al. 2010). 
 
Reflecting this additional awareness, various international organizations have provided definitions, standards,  and 
regulations regarding CSR. In particular, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO, 2010) officially  
published international guidelines for social responsibility, the ISO 26000. From an accounting perspective, the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC 2006a, 2006b) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA 2010) define CSR in terms of sustainability, which results from accounting transparency. Further, the AICPA 
(1994) suggest that current financial statements may not reflect the real value of a company properly, and should therefore 
be supplemented by non-financial information such as the disclosure of CSR activity. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the capital market participants perceive CSR from an accounting point 
of view. Recently CSR has been regarded as a type of signal by which managers convey private information about the 
company. Lys et al. (2012) find that CSR is a signal of managers’ expectations of future financial improvement. They 
suggest that although CSR investment may not directly improve financial performance, anticipation of future financial 
performance causes companies to invest in CSR in the current period. Further, we expect that CSR can signal improved  
earnings quality for two reasons. First, a company with poor financial performance may overstate earnings to mask its 
C 
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financial status (McNichols and Stubben 2008; Dharan and Lev 1993). Anticipation of future financial improvement  
can improve the quality of earnings because it curtails the incentive to engage in earnings management. Second, CSR 
provides a positive signal for reputation of the firm (e.g., Verschoor 2005; Linthicum et al. 2010). Managers who 
value firm reputation highly tend to avoid engaging in socially unacceptable activities to secure that reputation. 
Therefore, managers of a CSR firm are likely to refrain from earnings management to protect its reputation  (Kim et 
al. 2012). Thus, we posit a situation in which a company invests in CSR in expectation of high -quality financial 
reports. In particular, we examine the perception of CSR by key stakeholders such as investors and analysts.  
 
We use a sample of Korean listed companies for the period 2002–2011 and a proxy for CSR involvement based on 
the Korea Economic Justice Institute (KEJI) index. First, using earnings response coefficients  (ERCs) from regressions 
of returns on earnings to measure investors’ perceptions of earnings quality, we find that investors perceive earnings 
quality to be higher with the commitment to CSR activity. In addition, investors are willing to pay a premium fo r 
higher quality of earnings. Second, using earnings coefficients from future earnings forecasts -reported earnings 
regressions to measure analysts’ perceptions of earnings quality, we find that financial analysts also perceive earnings 
quality as improving with the commitment to CSR activity. Our results provide evidence that capital market  
participants perceive CSR as a signal of improved earnings quality. 
 
This study contributes to the CSR literature as follows. Previous studies about the effect of CSR on the capital market  
focus on stock value, forecast accuracy, and the cost of capital (Hwang 2009; Ioannou and Serafeim 2010; Na and 
Hong 2011; Ghoul et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Very few previous studies examine the 
usefulness of CSR-related information as recognized by capital market participants. We examine the perceptions of 
investors and financial analysts in terms of the relationship between CSR and earnings quality. Extending Lys et al. 
(2012) who suggest that CSR signals managers’ expectations of future financial improvement, we provide evidence 
that CSR involvement may signal the usefulness of accounting information. 
 
In the next section, we discuss the literature review and develop our hypotheses. We then describe our re search design 
used to test the hypotheses in Section 3, and discuss the sample in Section 4. Section 5 provides the empirical results. 
The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHES ES 
 
CSR activity has been regarded as a signal by which managers convey private information about a company, as 
distinguished from casual interpretations (Lys et al. 2012). Signal plays a very important role in the capital market . 
According to signaling theory, companies send signals about their exist ence and identities where information  
asymmetry exists (Spence 1973, 1974). In particular, they try to provide sufficient information to counteract 
undervaluation caused by adverse selection. A company listed in the stock market may choose to provide more 
information than what is required by law or more information than average. Even the fact that no information is 
provided functions as a signal (Campbell et al. 2001). Lys et al. (2012) find a positive association between financial 
performance and CSR investment. This positive association is likely due to the signal value of CSR investment. They 
suggest that CSR investment does not in itself improve financial performance; however, the anticipation of future 
financial performance drives companies to invest in CSR activity in the current period. Thus, engagement in CSR 
activity is a signal of managers’ expectations of future financial improvement. Further, CSR investment can signal 
future earnings quality. A company with poor financial performance may overstate earnings to mask its financial status 
(McNichols and Stubben 2008; Dharan and Lev 1993). Alternatively, anticipation of future financial improvement can 
improve the quality of earnings because it stabilizes earnings and curtails the incentives to engage in earnings 
management. 
 
CSR activity provides a positive signal regarding the reputation of the firm (e.g., Verschoor 2005; Linthicum et al. 
2010). The managers of a firm that value its reputation are likely to refrain from engaging in unethical activitie s. Kim 
et al. (2012) and Choi and Moon (2013) find a negative association between CSR and earnings management. They 
suggest that firms that prioritize CSR behave responsibly in order to curtail earnings management, thereby delivering  
more transparent and reliable financial information to stakeholders. Thus, CSR investment may signal managers’ 
expectations of improved earnings quality. 
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In this study, we investigate the perception of CSR by capital market participants and its potential to improve earnings 
quality. We first analyze how investors recognize CSR as it is reflected in stock price. Investors are key stakeholders 
who use corporate financial and non-financial information to evaluate firm performance. According to previous 
studies (Schipper and Vincent 2003; Teoh and Wong 1993), investors perceive the quality of earnings to be high when 
earnings are stable and improving in the future. They may be willing to pay a premium in these circumstances. If a 
company engages in CSR activity to distinguish itself from other companies, investors may recognize CSR activity 
as a signal of higher earnings quality. Thus, we expect that investors will perceive accounting information about 
companies that engage in CSR activity to be more useful than that about companies t hat do not engage in CSR activity. 
The preceding discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Investors perceive earnings quality as being improved by engagement in activity  related to corporate 
social responsibility. 
 
Financial analysts deliver information regarding the predicted value related to future earnings of a company to 
investors, acting as information mediators which solve the problems of information asymmetry (Campbell and Kracaw 
1980). The corporate value-related information reflected in their reports has a significant effect on stock pricing 
(Francis and Soffer 1997; Schipper 1991; Brown et al. 1987). Financial analysts are likely to respond to information  
about CSR activity. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) state that many financial analysts tend to show interest in companies that 
engage in CSR activity because these companies publicly announce more information than those that are not involved 
in CSR activity. Ioannou and Serafeim (2010) state that the more a company engages in CSR activity, the more 
investment recommendations it receives from analysts. Thus, financial analysts can naturally tend to use information  
about CSR activity in forecasting earnings because of uncertainty and information asymmetry surrounding ca pital 
market. Analysts may perceive that CSR serves as a signal of high quality of earnings because CSR is the symbolic 
representative of credibility of financial information and improvement of future financial performance. Accordingly, 
our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Analysts perceive earnings quality as being improved by engagement in activity related to corporate 
social responsibility. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Investors’ Perceptions  
 
To examine whether investors perceive earnings  quality as being affected by signals related to CSR, we estimate the 
following equation which is similar to the research methodology of Ghosh and Moon (2005): 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑡 ×𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∆ 𝐸𝑡 ×𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑅 + ∑ 𝛽6 + 2( 𝑗−1 )
6
𝑗 =1
𝐸 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽7 +2( 𝑗− 1)
6
𝑗 =1
∆𝐸×𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽17+ 𝑗
6
𝑗 =1
𝐶𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 /𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐷𝑢𝑚 𝑚𝑖𝑒 𝑠 + 𝜀  (1) 
 
We use the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns ending three months after the fiscal year-end (RET) as the 
dependent variable in Equation (1). E is net income and △ E is the difference in net income between current and last 
years. Both E and △ E are divided by the beginning of the year market value of equity. We add both measures in our 
regression model to increase the explanatory power and magnitude of ERCs by reflecting transitory and permanent 
components of earnings (Ghosh and Moon 2005; Easton and Harris 1991; Ali and Zarowin 1992). DCSR is an 
indicator variable for the company ranked in the KEJI index. Each control variable is interacted with E and △ E and 
is included on Equation (1). 
 
The sum of earnings levels and changes in coefficients (β1 + β2 ), ERC, is our measure for investor perceptions of 
earnings quality. In this study, our focus is on the sum of the E×DCSR and △ E×DCSR  coefficients (β3 + β4 ). If 
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investors perceive earnings quality as improving (declining) with the engagement of a company in CSR activity, β3 +
β4 is expected to be greater (less) than zero. 
 
We include various control variables which are associated with ERC. A firm’s maturity influences earnings quality 
and older firms are more likely to be stable and have fewer problems with info rmation asymmetry, which suggests 
higher ERCs (Ghosh and Moon 2010). Thus, we include AGE measured by the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of years a firm has been incorporated. Large auditors are generally more effective in constraining earnings 
management and provide higher quality audits (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Teoh and Wong 1993). Thus, we control for 
BIG4, which equals one when the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise. We include MB and BETA 
in our regression model, motivated by valuation considerations (Warfield et al. 1995). MB is the market-to-book ratio 
defined as the market value of assets (sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt) divided by the 
book value of total assets, and BETA is market risk estimated from 60 prior monthly stock returns. Large firms are 
likely to be exposed to more political costs and try to reduce political costs arising from high profitability, which 
affects earnings quality. Thus, we control for SIZE, which is the logarithmic transformation of total assets. Highly 
leveraged firms tend to have more incentives to avoid potential debt-covenant violations, which also affects earnings 
quality (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Thus, we include LEV, which is the ratio of total debt to tota l assets. In addition, 
we include industry and year fixed effects. 
 
3.2 Analysts’ Perceptions  
 
To examine the influence of commitment to CSR activity on financial analysts’ perceptions of earnings quality, we 
estimate Equation (2) following Ghosh and Moon (2005): 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 −1 + 𝛽2 ∆𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡− 1 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡 −1 ×𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡 −1 + 𝛽4 ∆𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 −1 ×𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡 − 1 + 𝛽5 𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡 − 1 +
∑ 𝛽6 +2 (𝑗 −1)
7
𝑗 = 1
𝐸×𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽7 +2( 𝑗 −1)
7
𝑗 = 1
∆𝐸 ×𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 +
∑ 𝛽19 + 𝑗
7
𝑗 =1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 / 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀  (2) 
 
FEPS  𝑡  is the mean annual earnings per share (EPS) forecast for year t issued after the release of earnings for year t − 
1. We use reported EPS and changes in EPS (𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 and △ EPS𝑡 −1) instead of E and △ E in Equation (1). 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 −1 is 
actual annual EPS for year t − 1. ∆𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 is the absolute change in reported EPS for year t − 1, which is the difference 
in annual EPS between year t − 1 and year t − 2 (∣𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1– 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−2∣). When a large earnings surprise is transitory, 
the predictive power of past earnings in forecasting future earnings is low (Barron et al. 2002). Thus, we include both 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 and △ EPS𝑡 −1 in Equation (2). 
 
We include the control variables which affect analysts’ incentives to acquire information about future earnings (e.g., 
Baron et al. 2002; Lang and Lundholm 1996). Older firms are likely to have more stable financial performance, and 
thus it is easier to predict earnings for older firms. Thus, we control for AGE measured by the natural logarithm of 
one plus the number of years a firm has been incorporated. Analysts perceive earnings quality as improving for firms  
which are audited by big auditors (Barron et al. 2002; Lang and Lundholm 1996). Thus, we include BIG4 in our 
regression model, which equals one when the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise. Firms with high 
growth opportunities tend to have high information asymmetry and thus less rely on reported earnings in predicting 
earnings (Barron et al. 2002; Lang and Lundholm 1996). Thus, we include the market -to-book ratio of assets (MB) 
computed as the market value of assets (sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt) divided by the 
book value of total assets. To control for the risk, we include both a market -based measure and an accounting-based 
measure. BETA is market risk estimated from 60 prior monthly stock returns, and LEV is financial leverage computed 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Large firms tend to have more information available to investors than small 
firms and thus firm size is related to the predictability of future earnings (DeFond and Hung 2003; Barron et al. 2002). 
We include SIZE, which is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. We further include COVERAGE, which 
is measured as the number of analysts following the firm (Lang and Lundholm 1996). We measure our explanatory  
variables including DCSR at the end of year t − 1. 
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4. DATA 
4.1 Sample Selection 
 
To examine the effects of CSR engagement on the perception of participants in the capital market, we begin by 
collecting information on CSR activity. We identify CSR companies by being included in the list of the top 200 best 
corporate citizens from 2002 to 2011 published by the Korea Economic Justice Institute (KEJI), a leading CSR rating 
agency in Korea.1 
 
The empirical analysis includes a set of non-financial and unregulated KOSPI (equivalent to NYSE) listed companies 
for the period 2002 to 2011. We supplement the KEJI data with financial data from KISVALUE. Stock returns and 
analysts’ forecast data are obtained from the FN Guide. We exclude merged, acquired, and delisted companies from 
the Korean stock market. Additionally, we exclude companies for which no data was available. As a result, the final 
sample includes 5,388 company-year observations for the analysis of investors’ perceptions and 1,982 company-year 
observations for the analysis of analysts’ perceptions. To remove the effects of outliers, we winsorize all continuous 
variables at the top and bottom 1 percentile. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample, including the mean, first quartile, median, third quartile, and 
standard deviation for all variables. The mean (median) RET is 0.185 (0.057), while the mean (median) E and △E are 
0.084 (0.096) and 0.047 (0.005), respectively. The mean (median) FEPS is 5.941 (2.865) thousand won, the mean  
(median) EPS is 4.808 (1.967) thousand won, and the mean (median) △EPS is 0.514 (0.150) thousand won. More than 
33% of all observations (i.e., 33.8%) are involved in CSR. 
 
For the control variables, the mean AGE is 36.8 years. Almost 58.6% of the companies in the sample are audited by 
large auditors (BIG4). The mean (median) values for the other variables, market -to-book ratio (MB), systematic risk 
(BETA), total assets (TA), and debt ratio (LEV), are 1.011 (0.706), 0.931 (0.902), 1,440 (228) billion won, and 0.449 
(0.454), respectively. 
 
  
                                                                 
1
The validity of the KEJI index is supported by its long history of publication (since 1991) and its extended use in Korean CSR studies (Hwang 
2009; Chun and Kim 2010; Kim and Wi 2010; Oh et al. 2011; Yook and Choi 2011). The KEJI index is rated based on quantitative and qualitative 
measures and is organized into seven major categories: environmental impact, community and society, corporate governance, corporate integrity, 
customers, employees, and long-term orientation. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
RET 0.185 -0.210 0.057 0.406 0.623 
E 0.084 0.024 0.096 0.192 0.349 
△E 0.047 -0.057 0.005 0.081 0.498 
FEPS (thousand won) 5.941 1.210 2.865 6.248 9.243 
EPS (thousand won) 4.808 0.636 1.967 5.072 9.077 
△EPS (thousand won) 0.514 -0.658 0.150 1.285 4.757 
DCSR 0.338 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.473 
AGE(year) 36.788 29.000 37.000 46.000 15.185 
BIG4 0.586 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.493 
MB 1.011 0.427 0.706 1.221 0.956 
BETA 0.931 0.630 0.902 1.199 0.421 
TA (billion won) 1.440 105 228 661 5.420 
LEV 0.449 0.299 0.454 0.591 0.197 
COVERAGE 7.766 2.000 5.000 13.000 7.030 
Definitions: 
RET:  12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns ending three months after the fiscal year-end 
E:  Net income divided by the beginning of the year market value of equity 
△E:  Difference in net income between current and last years divided by the beginning of the year market value of equity 
FEPS:  Mean annual EPS forecast for year t  issued after the release of earnings for year t − 1  (thousand won) 
EPS:  Actual annual EPS for year t − 1 (thousand won) 
△EPS:  Absolute change in reported EPS for year t  − 1, which  is the difference in annual EPS between year t  − 1 and year t − 2  (∣EPSt-1-
EPSt-2∣) (thousand won) 
DCSR: Indicator variable that equals one for the company ranked in the KEJI index and zero otherwise 
AGE: Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the company has been incorporated 
BIG4:  Indicator variable that equals one when the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise 
MB:  Market-to-book ratio computed as the market value of assets (sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt) divided 
by the book value of total assets 
BETA:  Market risk estimated from 60 prior monthly stock returns 
TA:  Total assets (billion won) 
SIZE:  logarithmic transformation of total assets 
LEV:  Total debt divided by total assets 
COVERAGE:  Number of analysts following the firm 
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables included in Equation (1). RET is positively correlated 
with E (0.174) and △E (0.131), and E is also positively correlated with △E (0.474). DCSR is positively correlated 
with E (0.147), consistent with the results of prior studies in which financial performance was directly or indirectly  
associated with commitment to CSR activity (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001; Hull and Rothenberg 
2008; Beurden and Gössling 2008; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Guiral 2012; Surroca et al. 2010). The correlation 
between SIZE and BIG4 (0.281) is higher than any of the other correlations, excluding that between E and △E. Overall, 
most explanatory variables are not highly correlated with each other. Therefore, multi-collinearity is not a problem. 
 
Table 2. Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
 RET E △E DCSR AGE BIG4 MB BETA SIZE LEV 
RET 1.000          
E 0.174*** 1.000         
△E 0.131*** 0.474*** 1.000        
DCSR 0.019 0.147*** -0.011 1.000       
AGE -0.001 -0.018 -0.003 0.054*** 1.000      
BIG4 0.011 0.047*** 0.003 0.106*** -0.041*** 1.000     
MB 0.130*** -0.073*** 0.018 0.055*** -0.143*** 0.095*** 1.000    
BETA 0.016 -0.080*** 0.023* -0.066*** -0.036*** 0.055*** 0.103*** 1.000   
SIZE 0.014 0.066*** -0.004 0.211*** 0.052*** 0.281*** 0.123*** 0.210*** 1.000  
LEV 0.034** -0.197*** 0.039*** -0.203*** -0.010 0.037*** 0.160*** 0.210*** 0.151*** 1.000 
The definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 The Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
In Table 3, we report the findings from testing of how a company’s commitment to CSR activity affects the returns–
earnings association. Consistent with previous studies, reported earnings (E and  ∆E) are significantly and positively 
associated with returns; the ERC (β1 + β2 ) in Model (1) is 0.311 (F = 189.50). Furthermore, the sum of the coefficients 
of E × DCSR and ΔE × DCSR (β3 + β4 ) is positive and significant (1.308, F = 127.13). These results suggest that 
investors pay more for reported earnings when a company engages in CSR activity. 
 
In Model (2) that includes various control variables, β1 + β2 and β3 + β4  both remain positive and significant; it is 
0.455 (F = 237.57) and 1.246 (F = 119.56), respectively. After controlling for other variables in the model, our results 
hold that investors pay a premium for earnings for CSR companies. This evidence supports hypothesis 1, suggesting 
that investors perceive earnings about companies that engage in CSR activity to be more informative than that of 
companies which do not. 
 
Table 3. Earnings Response Coefficients and Perceptions of Investors 
  Dependent Variable = RET 
Variable Coefficient Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept (α) 0.070 (2.62)*** -0.273 (-1.85)* 
E (𝛽1) 0.251 (10.00)
*** 0.385 (11.72)*** 
∆E (𝛽2) 0.060 (3.52)
*** 0.070 (3.10)*** 
 (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ) 0.311 (189.50)
*** 0.455 (237.57)*** 
E×DCSR (𝛽3) 0.620 (5.09)
*** 0.736 (6.16)*** 
∆E×DCSR (𝛽4) 0.688 (5.74)
*** 0.510 (4.34)*** 
 (𝛽3 + 𝛽4 ) 1.308 (127.13)
*** 1.246 (119.56)*** 
DCSR (𝛽5) -0.109 (-4.78)
*** -0.138 (-5.89)*** 
Control Variable:    
E×AGE(𝛽6) / ∆E×AGE(𝛽7) (𝛽6 + 𝛽7 ) 
 -0.094 (11.02)*** 
E×BIG4(𝛽8) / ∆E×BIG4(𝛽9) (𝛽8 + 𝛽9  ) 
 -0.034 (6.16)** 
E×MB(𝛽10) / ∆E×MB(𝛽11) (𝛽10 + 𝛽11  ) 
 0.001 (2.32) 
EE×BETA(𝛽12) / ∆E×BETA(𝛽13) (𝛽12 + 𝛽13  ) 
 4.909 (6.45)** 
E×SIZE(𝛽14) / ∆E×SIZE(𝛽15) (𝛽14 + 𝛽15  ) 
 0.011 (7.89)*** 
E×LEV(𝛽16) / ∆E×LEV(𝛽17) (𝛽16 + 𝛽17  ) 
 -0.044 (19.49)*** 
AGE (𝛽18) 
 0.020 (1.66)* 
BIG4 (𝛽19) 
 -0.000 (-0.00) 
MB (𝛽20) 
 0.097 (11.70)*** 
BETA (𝛽21) 
 -1.244 (-0.65) 
SIZE (𝛽22) 
 0.005 (0.97) 
LEV (𝛽23)  0.067 (1.60) 
Industry Dummy   Included 
Year Dummy   Included 
Adj. R2  0.281 0.326 
F-Value  77.60*** 57.41*** 
N  5,388 5,388 
The definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
5.2 The Results for Hypothesis 2 
 
Table 4 reports the results of regressions based on Equation (2). In the first column in Table 4 reporting the results of 
Model (1) without the control variables, actual earnings released just before the forecasts are positively associated 
with analysts’ consensus forecast of earnings one year ahead. β1 + β2 is positive and highly significant (0.496, F = 
534.15). Moreover, β3 + β4  is also positive and significant (0.318, F = 83.11). Our results suggest that analysts rely 
more on reported EPS in forecasting EPS in the year ahead when a company engages in CSR activity. When we 
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estimate Model (2) including a number of control variables, β3 + β4  remains positive and significant (0.209, F = 
38.71). This evidence supports the second hypothesis that financial analysts perceive CSR as a signal of improved  
earnings quality. 
 
Table 4. Analyst Earnings Forecasts and Perceptions of Information Intermediaries 
  Dependent Variable = FEPS  
 Coefficients Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept (α) 1.847(5.53)*** -8.085(-4.23)*** 
EPS (𝛽1) 0.961(60.60)
*** 1.080(41.07)*** 
∆EPS (𝛽2) -0.465(-18.93)
*** -0.375(-11.33)*** 
 (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ) 0.496(534.15)
*** 0.705(413.03)*** 
EPS×DCSR (𝛽3) 0.066(3.27)
*** -0.009(-0.44) 
∆EPS×DCSR (𝛽4) 0.252(6.43)
*** 0.218(5.82)*** 
 (𝛽3 + 𝛽4 ) 0.318(83.11)
*** 0.209(38.71)*** 
DCSR (𝛽5) -0.571 (-3.44)
*** -0.344 (-2.19)** 
Control Variables:    
EPS×AGE(𝛽6) / ∆EPS×AGE(𝛽7) (𝛽6 + 𝛽7 ) 
 -0.018(0.66) 
EPS×BIG4(𝛽8) / ∆EPS×BIG4(𝛽9) (𝛽8 + 𝛽9  ) 
 0.107(24.25)*** 
EPS×MB(𝛽10) / ∆EPS×MB(𝛽11) (𝛽10 + 𝛽11  ) 
 0.018(9.67)*** 
EPS×BETA(𝛽12) / ∆EPS×BETA(𝛽13) (𝛽12 + 𝛽13  ) 
 12.696(27.57)*** 
EPS×SIZE(𝛽14) / ∆EPS×SIZE(𝛽15) (𝛽14 + 𝛽15  ) 
 -0.010(8.76)*** 
EPS×LEV(𝛽16) / ∆EPS×LEV(𝛽17) (𝛽16 + 𝛽17  ) 
 -0.052(1.92) 
EPS×COVERAGE(𝛽18) / ∆EPS×COVERAGE(𝛽19) (𝛽18 + 𝛽19  ) 
 0.001(0.23) 
AGE (𝛽20)  0.070(0.59) 
BIG4 (𝛽21) 
 -0.398(-2.27)** 
MB (𝛽22) 
 0.008(0.10) 
BETA (𝛽23) 
 -3.385(-1.82)* 
SIZE (𝛽24) 
 0.354(4.79)*** 
LEV (𝛽25) 
 1.080 (2.35)** 
COVERAGE (𝛽26) 
 -0.021(-1.32) 
Industry Dummy   Included 
Year Dummy   Included 
Adj. R2  0.892 0.913 
F-Value  596.15*** 420.50*** 
N  1,982 1,982 
The definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
5.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Although third parties such as KEJI track and rate CSR activity, firms have become increasingly willing to disclose 
CSR reports voluntarily in recent years. There is a steadily increasing trend in the number of CSR reports over time 
(from 2 in 2003 to 47 in 2011). Although CSR performance ratings are available to investors and fin ancial analysts, 
ratings alone are unlikely to provide sufficient information for them to assess a firm’s overall CSR performance. 
Voluntarily disclosing CSR activity demonstrates firms’ confidence in their CSR performance, which sends a signal 
to investors and analysts (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Therefore, voluntary CSR disclosures may provide additional 
information necessary for investors and analysts to assimilate these summary ratings. To control for the effect of 
voluntary CSR disclosure on capital market participants’ perception beyond the information in CSR ratings, we 
additionally include an indicator variable (REPORT) that equals one when a firm voluntarily discloses a CSR report 
and zero otherwise in Equations (1) and (2). 
 
In Panel A of Table 5, 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 and β3 + β4  both remain positive and significant in Model (2) even after controlling 
for the release of CSR reports; they are 0.452 (F = 233.71) and 1.236 (F = 117.61). The sum of the coefficients of 
E×REPORT  and ∆E×REPORT  (β5 + β6 ) is also positive and significant (0.869, F = 6.07). These results again indicate 
that the engagement of CSR affects the returns–earnings association after controlling for the release of CSR reports. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2016 Volume 32, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1515 The Clute Institute 
In Panel B of Table 5, β1 + β2 in Model (2) is positive and highly significant (0.679, F = 373.50). Moreover, β3 + β4  
is also positive and significant (0.215, F = 41.13), consistent with the results of Table 4. β5 + β6  is also positive and 
significant (0.229, F = 25.32). The results indicate that analysts count more on reported earnings in forecasting future 
earnings for companies ranked in the KEJI, reinforcing our primary results. 
 
Table 5. Capital Market Perceptions: Controlling for the Issuance of CSR Report 
Panel A: Perceptions of Investors 
  Dependent Variable = RET 
Variable Coefficient Model (1) Model (2) 
E (𝛽1) 0.250(9.97)
*** 0.383(11.64)*** 
∆E (𝛽2) 0.059(3.45)
*** 0.069(3.06)*** 
 (𝛽1 + 𝛽2  ) 0.309(186.97)
*** 0.452(233.71)*** 
E×DCSR (𝛽3) 0.632(5.18)
*** 0.751(6.26)*** 
∆E×DCSR (𝛽4) 0.660(5.48)
*** 0.485(4.11)*** 
 (𝛽3 + 𝛽4  ) 1.292(124.19)
*** 1.236(117.61)*** 
E×REPORT (𝛽5) 0.419(1.11) 0.325(0.89) 
∆E×REPORT (𝛽6) 0.601(2.26)
** 0.544(2.11)** 
 (𝛽5 + 𝛽6  ) 1.020(7.92)
*** 0.869(6.07)** 
Adj. R2  0.282 0.327 
 
Panel B: Perceptions of Financial Analysts 
  Dependent Variable = FEPS 
 Coefficients Model (1) Model (2) 
EPS (𝛽1) 0.961(61.14)
*** 1.082(41.04)*** 
∆EPS (𝛽2) -0.494(-19.78)
*** -0.403(-12.11)*** 
 (𝛽1 + 𝛽2  ) 0.467(455.44)
*** 0.679(373.50)*** 
EPS×DCSR (𝛽3) 0.039(1.87)
* -0.019(-0.97) 
∆EPS×DCSR (𝛽4) 0.270(6.94)
*** 0.234(6.29)*** 
 (𝛽3 + 𝛽4  ) 0.309(79.84)
*** 0.215(41.13)*** 
EPS×REPORT (𝛽5) 0.046(1.99)
** 0.001(0.02) 
∆EPS×REPORT (𝛽6) 0.180(3.78)
*** 0.228(4.64)*** 
 (𝛽5 + 𝛽6  ) 0.226(27.80)
*** 0.229(25.32)*** 
Adj. R2  0.895 0.914 
Report: Indicator variable that equals one when a firm issues a CSR report and zero otherwise 
The definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. To save space, we do not report parameter estimates for the other variables. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
6. CONCLUS ION 
 
This study provides insights into the recent debate surrounding CSR. We analyze the relationship between CSR and 
earnings quality as perceived by capital market participants. Based on the effect of firm engagement in CSR activity 
on perceived reliability of reported earnings, we infer how capital market participants view engagement in CSR 
activity as improving earnings quality. When all else is equal, if capital market participants perceive the signal of 
engagement in CSR activity as improving earnings quality, then they view reported financial statements as more 
reliable. 
 
We analyze the perceptions of investors and financial analysts, primary users  of accounting reports in the capital 
market. Employing a comprehensive sample of Korean firms during the 2002 to 2011 period, we find evidence 
supporting our hypotheses that investors and analysts see earnings quality to be higher with the commitment to CSR 
activity. Therefore, our results suggest that capital market participants perceive CSR as a signal of improved earnings 
quality. 
 
An implication of this study is that capital market participants recognize the signal of commitment to CSR activity 
and have different perceptions of the informativeness of earnings from companies that engage in CSR activity and 
those that do not. 
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